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Abstract 
As probabilistic systems gain popularity and are 
coming into wider use, the need for a mechanism 
that explains the system's findings and recom­
mendations becomes more critical. The system 
will also need a mechanism for ordering compet­
ing explanations. We examine two representa­
tive approaches to explanation in the literature­
one due to Gardenfors and one due to Pearl-and 
show that both suffer from significant problems. 
We propose an approach to defining a notion of 
"better explanation" that combines some of the 
features of both together with more recent work 
by Pearl and others on causality. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Probabilistic inference is often hard for humans to under­
stand. Even a simple inference in a small domain may 
seem counterintuitive and surprising; the situation only 
gets worse for large and complex domains. Thus, a sys­
tem doing probabilistic inference must be able to explain 
its findings and recommendations to evoke confidence on 
the part of the user. Indeed, in experiments with medical 
diagnosis systems, medical students not only trusted the 
system more when presented with an explanation of the 
diagnosis, but also were more confident about disagreeing 
with it when the explanations did not account adequately 
for all of the aspects of the case (Suennondt and Cooper 
1992). Explanation can also play an important role in refin­
ing and debugging probabilistic systems. An incorrect or 
partially correct explanation should be the best indication 
to an expert of a potential problem. 
Our goal is to find a notion of explanation in a probabilistic 
setting that can be usefully applied by a reasoning system 
to explain its findings to a human. Of course, we are not 
the first to examine explanation. It has been has analyzed 
by philosophers for many years. Traditionally, it has been 
modeled by introducing a deductive relation between the 
explanation and the fact to be explained (explanandum) 
(Hempel and Oppenheim 1948). W hile perhaps applicable 
to scientific enquiry, this approach is not easily applicable 
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in domains with uncertainty. There have been numerous 
proposals, both probabilistic and qualitative, for defining 
explanation in such domains. ((GID'denfors 1988; Hempel 
1 %5; Salmon 1984) describe the work done by the philoso­
phers and give numerous references; the more recent work 
in AI includes, for example, (Boutilier and Becher 1995; 
Henrion and Druzdzel 1990; Pearl 1988; Shimony 1991; 
Suermondt 1992).) Since we are interested in explanation 
in probabilistic systems, our focus is on proposals that seek 
a probabilistic connection between the explanation and the 
explanandum. In the philosophical literature, the focus has 
been on the probability of the explanandum given the ex­
planation. The requirements range from just requiring that 
this conditional probability change, to requiring that it be 
very high, to requiring that it be greater than the uncon­
ditional probability of the explanandum (so that learning 
the explanation increases the probability of the explanan­
dum); see (Giirdenfors 1988; Salmon 1984) for discussion 
and further references. In contrast, the research on expla­
nation in Bayesian networks (Henrion and Druzdzel 1990; 
Pearl 1988; Shimony 1991) has concentrated on comput­
ing the conditional probability of the explanation given the 
explanandum, adding in some cases the additional require­
ment that the explanation be a complete world description. 
Clearly the appropriateness of a notion of explanation will 
depend in large part on the intended application. A scientific 
explanation might well have different properties from an 
explanation provided by an intelligent tutoring system. In 
our intended application, the system will typically have 
some uncertainty regarding the true state of the world (and 
possibly even the domain's causal structure), represented 
as a probability distribution. Note that this is different 
from, say, an intelligent tutoring system, where we assume 
the system to have the full knowledge of the domain. For 
simplicity, we make the (admittedly unrealistic) assumption 
that the user's knowledge can be identified with the system's 
knowledge.1 Because we expect that there will typically be 
a number of competing explanations that can be provided 
to the user, we are interested not just in finding an absolute 
notion of explanation, but a comparative notion. We want 
to be able to judge when one explanation is better than 
another. 
1Modeling the user's knowledge and adjusting the explanation 
to fit it is one of the planned extensions of this work. 
In this paper, we concentrate on two definitions of expla­
nation, one due to Gardenfors (I 988) and the other to Pearl 
(1988), as representatives of the two approaches mentioned 
above. While, as we point out, there are significant prob­
lems with these definitions, we consider them because they 
have some important features that we feel should constitute 
part of an approach to defining explanation. We suggest an 
approach that combines what we feel are the best features 
of these two definitions with some ideas from the more re­
cent work on causality (Balke and Pearll994; Druzdzel and 
Simon 1993; Beckerman and Shachter 1995; Pearl 1 995). 
One of the observations that falls naturally out of our ap­
proach is that we should expect different answers depending 
on whether we are asking for an explanation of beliefs or 
facts. For example, if the agent believes that it rained last 
night and we ask for an explanation for this belief, then a 
perfectly reasonable explanation is that he or she notic:OO 
the wet grass in the morning, which is correlated with rain. 
However, if the agent observes that it is raining and we ask 
for the best explanation of this observation, then it would 
certainly not be satisfactory to be told that the grass is wet. 
We do not accept the wet grass as an explanation in the 
second case because the wet grass is not a cause of rain. 
However, we would accept it in the first case because the 
agent believing that the grass is wet is a cause of the agent 
believing that it rained. The critical difference between ex­
planations of beliefs and explanations of observations does 
not seem to have been discussed before in the literature. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections 
2 and 3 we present and analyze Gardenfors' and Pearl's 
definitions. In Section 4 we present a new approach which 
generalizes elements of both. We conclude with some open 
problems in Section 5. 
2 GARDENFORS' APPROACH 
2.1 THE DEFINITION 
As we suggested earlier, roughly speaking, for Gardenfors, 
X is an explanation of E if Pr(EIX) > Pr(E). That is, X 
is an explanation of E if learning X raises the probability 
of E. In order to flesh out this intuition, we need to make 
precise what probability distribution we are using. 
According to Gardenfors, what requires explanation is 
something that is already known, but was unexpected : A 
person asking for an explanation expresses a "cognitive dis­
sonance" between the explanandum and the rest of his or 
her beliefs. We don 't typically require an explanation for 
something we expected all along. The amount of disso­
nance is measured by the surprise value of the explanan­
dum in the belief state in which we reject our belief in 
the explanandum while holding as many as possible of our 
other beliefs intact (this operation is called contraction and 
comes from the belief revision framework (Alchourr6n, 
Gardenfors, and Makinson 1985)). An explanation pro­
vides "cognitive relief"; the degree of "cognitive relief" is 
measured by the degree to which the explanation decreases 
the surprise value. 
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For example, if we ask for an explanation of why David 
has the flu, then we already know that David has the flu. 
Thus, if E is the statement "David has the flu", then in 
the current situation, we already ascribe probability 1 to E. 
Nothing that we could learn could increase that probability. 
On the other hand, we presumably asked for an explanation 
because before David got sick, we did not expect him to 
get sick. That is, if Pr:E describes the agent's probability 
distribution in the contracted belief state, before David got 
flu, we expect Pr:E (E) not to be too high. An explanation X 
(like "David was playing with Sara, who also has the flu") 
would raise the probability of E in the contracted belief 
state, that is, we have 
PrE;(EIX) > PrE;(E). 
As Giirdenfors' definition stresses, what counts as an expla­
nation depends on the agent's epistemic state. An explana­
tion for one agent may not be an explanation for another, as 
the following example, essentially taken from (Giirdenfors 
1988), shows. 
Example 2.1 If we ask why Mr. Johansson has been taken 
ill with lung cancer, the information that he worked in as­
bestos manufacturing for many years is not going to be a 
satisfactory explanation if we don't know anything about 
the effects of asbestos on people's health. Adding the state­
ment "70% of those who work with asbestos develop lung 
cancer" makes the explanation complete. The explana­
tion must consist of both statements. However, if we try 
to explain Mr. Johansson's illness to his close friend, who 
is likely to know his profession, we would supply only the 
second piece of information. Similarly, to someone who 
knows more about asbestos but less about Mr Johansson, 
we would only present the information about his profession. 
To formalize these intuitions, Glirdenfors characterizes a 
(probabilistic) epistemic state using the possible worlds 
model. At any given time, an agent is assumed to con­
sider a number of worlds (or states of the world) possible. 
For example, if the agent looks out the window and notices 
that it is raining, his set of possible worlds would include 
only worlds where it is raining. Learning new facts about 
the world further restricts the set of the worlds we con� 
sider possible. Among the possible worlds, some may be 
more likely than the others. To describe this likelihood, the 
agent is assumed to have a probability distribution over the 
possible worlds. 
Thus, an epistemic state is taken to be a pair K = (W, Pr}, 
where W is a set of possible worlds (or possible states of the 
world) and Pr is a probability distribution on W. A sentence 
A is said to be accepted as knowledge in an epistemic state 
K if Pr( A) = 1. We sometimes abuse notation and write 
A E K if A is accepted in epistemic state K. 
Given an epistemic state K = (W, Pr} of an agent, let 
Ki: ::::: {WE', Pr:E) denote the contraction of K with re­
spect to E, i.e., the epistemic state characterizing the 
agent's beliefs that is as close to K as possible such that 
E � KF,. Gardenfors describes a number of postulates that 
K£ should satisfy, such as K"E = Kif Eft K. It is be­
yond the scope of this paper to discuss these postulates (see 
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(Alchourr6n, Giirdenfors, and Makinson 1985)). However, 
these postulates do not serve to specify Ki uniquely; that 
is, given K and E, there may be several epistemic states 
K' that satisfy the postulates. On the other band, there are 
some situations where it is straightforward to specify Ki. 
For example, if Pr is determined by a Bayesian network 
together with some observations, including E, then Pr£j is 
just the distribution that results from the Bayesian network 
and all the observations but E. 
We can now present Giirdenfors' definition of explanation. 
Definition 2.2 (from (Gll.rdenfors 1988)) X is an explana­
tion of E relative to a state of belief K = (W, Pr) (where 
E E K)if 
1. Pr:E(EIX) > Pr:g(E), and 
2. Pr(X) < 1 (that is, X ¢. K). 
We have already seen the first clause of this definition. 
Note that, in this clause (and throughout this paper), we 
identify the formulas E and X with sets of possible worlds, 
namely, the sets of worlds {in W.B') in which E and X, 
respectively, are true. The second clause helps enforce 
the intuition that the explanation depends on the agent's 
epistemic state. The explanation cannot be something the 
agent already knows. For example, fire will not be an 
explanation of smoke if the agent already knows that there 
is a fire. Notice that the second clause also prevents E 
from being an explanation for itself. (Clearly E satisfies 
the first clause, since Pr:E( EIE) > Pr:E( E); since we have 
assumed E E K, E does not satisfy the second clause.) 
Unfortunately, as we shall see, while the second clause does 
exclude E as an explanation, it does not exclude enough. 
Given this notion of explanation, we can define an ordering 
on explanations that takes into account the degree to which 
an explanation raises the probability of the explanandum. 
Gardenfors in fact defined explanatory power as the dif­
ference between the posterior and prior probability of the 
explanandum. Thus, a better explanation is one with better 
explanatory power. 
The difference is not always a good measure of distance 
between probabilities. An explanation which raises the 
probability of a statement of interest from 0.50000 l to 0.51 
is not so powerful . On the other hand, an explanation raising 
the probability from 0.000001 to 0.01 would be received 
quite differently, although the difference in probabilities is 
the same. A more natural way to define explanatory power 
is by using the ratio of the two probabilities. 
Definition 2.3 The explanatory power (EP) of X with re­
spect to E is 
EP(X E) = Pr:E(EIX). ' PrE( E) 
According to this definition, the two explanations above 
have dramatically different explanatory power. For this 
paper, we take the latter definition as our formal definition 
of explanatory power. 
Before we get to our critique of Gardenfors' definition, 
there is one other issue we need to discuss: the language 
in which explanations are given. Definition 2.3 makes per" 
feet sense if, for example, explanations are propositional 
formulas over a finite set of primitive propositions. In tha� 
case, a world w could be taken to be a truth assignment to 
a finite family of these primitive propositions. We could 
also take explanations to be first-order formulas, in which 
case a world could be taken to be a first -order interpretation. 
Gllrdenfors in fact allows even richer explanations, involv­
ing statistical statements. As we saw, in Example 2.1, a 
possible explanation of Mr. Johansson's illness for someone 
who already knew that he worked in asbestos manufactur­
ing is to say "70% of those who work with asbestos develop 
lung cancer". To make sense of this, Glirdenfors associates 
with a world not only a first-order interpretation, but a distri­
bution over individuals in the domain. (This type of model 
is also considered in (Halpern 1990), wbere a structure con­
sists of possible worlds, with a distribution over the worlds, 
and, in each world there is a distribution on the individuals 
in that world; a formal language is provided for reasoning 
about such models. If the domain is finite, we could sim­
plify things and assume that the distribution is the uniform 
distribution, as is done in (Bacchus, Grove, Halpern, and 
Koller 1996).) While it is not necessary to consider such 
a rich language to make sense of Glirdenfors' definition, 
one of his key insights is that statistical assertions are an 
important component of explanations. Indeed, he explicitly 
describes an explanation as a conjunction xl 1\ x2. where 
X1 is a conjunction of statistical assertions and X2 is what 
Glirdenfors calls a singular sentence, by which he means 
a Boolean combination of atomic sentences in a first-order 
language with only unary predicates. (Either conjunct may 
be omitted.) As we shall argue, we need to generalize this 
somewhat to allow causal assertions as well as statistical 
assertions. 
2.2 A CRITIQUE 
While Giirdenfors' definition has some compelling features 
(see (Glirdenfors 1988) for further discussion), it also has 
some serious problems, both practical and philosophical. 
We describe some of them in this section. 
1. While the second clause prevents E from being an ex­
planation of itself, there are many other explanations 
that it does not block. Let F be any formula such 
that Pr(F) < 1 and Pr:g( E 1\ F) > 0. Then E 1\ F 
will be an explanation for E. Moreover, it will be 
the explanation with the highest possible explanatory 
power (both according to G�denfors' original defi­
nition and our modification). This is obvious, since 
Pr:g( EI E 1\ F) = 1. Note that F can be practically 
any formula here. We surely wouldn't want to accept 
" E  and the coin lands heads" as an explanation for E. 
One possible solution to this problem is to restrict ex­
planations to only involving certain propositions. For 
example, if we are looking for an explanation for some 
symptoms, we might require that the explanation be a 
disease. There are many cases where such restrictions 
make sense, but if we are to do this, then we mus� 
explain where the restrictions are coming from. 
2. Even if we restrict attention to a particular vocabulary 
for explanations, there is nothing preventing us from 
adding irrelevant conjuncts to an explanation. More 
precisely, note that if X is an explanation of E, and 
C is conditionally independent of E given X, then 
PrE:(EJX) = Pri(EJX A C). Thus, X and X A C 
are viewed as equally good explanations. 
3. The definition does not take into account the likeli­
hood of the explanation. For example, suppose there 
are two explanations for a symptom s, disease d1 and 
disease d2, with the same explanatory power, but d1 
is a relatively common disease, while d2 is quite rare. 
If the explanation is given by an expert that is trusted 
by the user (as in the case of an intelligent tutoring 
system), then once we are told that, say d2 is the ex­
planation. we would presumably accept it as true. In 
this case, the prior probability (i.e., the fact that d2 is 
rare) is irrelevant. However, in our context, even if 
Pr; (sldt) = Pr; (s\d2), it seems clear that we should 
prefer the explanation dt to d2. 
4. The fact that learning X raises the probability of E 
does not by itself qualify X to be an explanation of 
E. For example, suppose s is a symptom of disease 
d and Bob knows this. If Bob learns from a doc­
tor that David has disease d and asks the doctor for 
an explanation, he certainly would not accept as an 
explanation that David has symptoms, even though 
Pr;I(djs) > Pr;f(d). Giirdenfors is aware of this is­
sue, and discusses it in some detail {1988, p. 205). He 
would call s an explanation of d, but not a causal ex­
planation. Gi!rdenfors provides a definition of causal 
explanation. Unfortunately, while it deals with this 
problem, it does not deal with the other problems we 
have raised, so we do not discuss it here.2 We dis­
agree with Gardefnors that there are explanations that 
are not causal; we view all explanations as causal. In 
particular, we do not think that Bob would accept s 
as an explanation of d at all. Note, however, that if 
Bob had asked the doctor why he ( the doctor) believed 
that David had disease d, an acceptable explanation 
would have been that the doctor believed (or knew) 
that David had symptoms. There is a big difference 
between what Bob would accept as an explanation for 
d and what he would accept as an explanation of the 
doctor's belief that d. We return to this issue below. 
5. As a practical matter, Gardenfors' definition requires 
the computation of the contraction of a belief state 
(besides the computation of many conditional proba-
2For the interested reader, C is said to be a causal explanation 
of E with respect to belief state K such that E E Kif ( 1) Pr( C) < 
1, (2) Pr:g(E\C) > Pr:g(E), (3) (Pr;j)(7 = PrE, where Pr;j is 
the belief state that arises when we add C to the stock of beliefs 
in K. This is the notion called belief expansion (Alchourr6n, 
Giirdenfors, and Makinson 1985). Thus, we add clause (3) to 
the definition of explanation. Note, however, if F is independent 
of E, then E 1\ F would be a causal explanation of E. Similar 
arguments show that Giirdenfors' definition of causal explanation 
still suffers from all the other problems we have raised. 
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bilities in that contracted belief state). If an approach 
like this is to be used in a system, we need techniques 
for computing the contraction. More accurately, since 
the contraction is not unique, we need to focus on ap­
plications where there is a relatively straightforward 
notion of contraction. 
3 THE MAXIMUM A POSTERIORI 
MODEL APPROACH 
3.1 THE DEFINITION 
Most of the work done on explanation in belief networks 
was based on the intuition that the best explanation for an 
observation is the state of the world that is most proba­
ble given the evidence (Henrion and Druzdzel 1990; Pearl 
1988; Shimony 1991). There is no notion of "cognitive 
dissonance" or surprise. The explanation is an (informed) 
guess about the possible world we are currently in, based 
on the evidence (which includes the explanandum). In 
some cases (e.g., (Pearl l988)), the guess must specify the 
world completely-formulas describing sets of worlds are 
not allowed as explanations. This approach, which we 
call Maximum A Posteriori model {MAP) after (Shimony 
1991 ), has been also known under other names: Most Prob­
able Explanation (MPE) (Pearl1988) and Scenario-Based 
Explanation (Henrion and Druzdzell990). 
Formally, according to Pearl, given an epistemic state 
K = (W, Pr}, an explanation for E is simply a world 
w in which E is true. This notion of explanation in­
duces an obvious ordering on explanations. World w1 is 
a better explanation of E than w2 if E is true in both w1 
and w2 and Pr(wiJE) > Pr(w2jE). Finally, the best or 
most probable explanation (MPE) is the world w* such that 
Pr(w*jE) = maxwEW Pr( wJE).3 
We remark that although we have spoken here of an ex­
planation as being a world, we could equally well take an 
explanation to be the formula that characterizes the world 
if we assume (as Pearl does) that each world is uniquely 
characterized by a formula. If our vocabulary consists of a 
finite number of propositions P1, ... , Pit, and each world is 
a truth ass1gnment to these primitive propositions, then an 
explanation would have the form QII\ • • •  A Qk, where each Qi 
is either Pi or •Pi· Of course, if we have richer languages, 
finding formulas that characterize worlds becomes more of 
an issue. 
Two other variants of the MAP approach have been pro­
posed, by Henrion and Druzdzel (1990) and Shimony 
(1991, 1993). They share with Pearl's definition two impor­
tant features: Ftrst, the explanation is a truth assigrunent to 
3 Actually, Pearl did not define the notion of explanation, just 
that of most probable explanation. However, our definitions are 
certainly in the spirit of his. Also, he did not talk explicitly of 
worlds and epistemic states, but these are implicit in his defini­
tions. Pearl assumes that there is a Bayesian network that de­
scribes a number of variables of interest. The set W then consists 
of all possible assignments to the variables, and the probability 
distribution Pr on W is determined by the Bayesian network. 
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a subset of propositions, including the explanandum. Sec­
ond, the ordering of explanations is based on their posterior 
probability given the explanandum. 
Henrion and Drozdzel actually discuss a number of ap­
proaches to explanation. Of most relevance here are what 
they call scenario-based explanations. They assume a tree 
of propositions (a scenario tree), where a path from the 
root to a leaf represents a scenario, or a sequence of events. 
They are looking for the scenario with the highest probabil­
ity given the explanandum.4 Thus, their approach differs 
from Pearl's in that the system has additional knowledge 
(the scenarios). They also allow explanations to be partial. 
The truth values of all propositions do not have to be spec­
ified. However, explanations are restricted to coming from 
a set of prespecified scenarios. 
Shimony (1991, 1993) also allows partial explanations. 
He works in the framework of Bayesian networks (as 
does Pearl, in fact, although his definition makes sense 
even if probabilities are not represented using Bayesian 
networks).5 In his framework, the explanandum is an in­
stantiation of (truth assignment to) some nodes in the net­
work; these are called the evidence nodes. An explanation 
is a truth assignment to the "relevant" nodes in the net­
work. The relevant nodes include the evidence nodes and 
only ancestors of evidence nodes can be relevant. Roughly 
speaking, an ancestor of a given node is irrelevant if it has 
the property that it is independent of that node given the 
values of the other ancestors. In (Shimony 1991), the best 
explanation is taken to be the one with the highest poste­
rior probability. In (Shimony 1993), this is extended to 
allow explanations to be sets of partial truth assignments, 
subject to certain constraints (discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.3.) 
3.2 A CRITIQUE 
The MAP approach has an advantage over Gardenfors': 
it doesn't require contraction. However, it has its own 
problems. Some of the problems are particularly acute in 
Pearl's approach, with its requirement that the explanation 
be complete; i.e., a world; they are alleviated somewhat if 
we allow partial explanations (sets of worlds). However, 
some of the problems arise in all variants of the approach, 
and are a consequence of ordering according to the posterior 
probability distribution. 
1. By making the explanation a complete world, the no­
tion becomes very sensitive to the choice of language, 
as Pearl himself observes. 6 For example, if our lan­
guage consists of {s, d1, d2}, then the best explanation 
4 Actually, they suggest presenting all scenarios that have suf­
ficiently high probability, and pointing out how the most probable 
one differs from the other likely scenarios. 
5Recall that a Bayesian network is an acyclic directed graph 
whose nodes represent primitive propositions {or random vari­
ables), together with conditional probability tables describing the 
probability of a node given instantiations of its parents (Pearl 
1988). 
6Shimony (1991) calls this the over specification problem. 
for symptoms might be d1, or, more precisely, the 
world characterized by s A d 1 A ...,d2. For the purposes 
of this example, suppose that diseases are mutually 
exclusive, so all worlds where the agent has more than 
one disease have probability 0. Now suppose we sub­
divide d1 into two diseases d� and d�', again mutually 
exclusive (as, for example, hepatitis can be subdivided 
into hepatitis A and hepatitis B). Then we might find 
d2 to be a better explanation than either d� or d� (that 
is, Pr( ·d� A ·d� A d2l s) may be greater than either 
Pr(d� A -.d'( A •d2ls) or Pr( ·d� Ad� A •d2ls )). 
Pearl gives an even sharper example of this phe­
nomenon. Suppose that d1 is a a diagnosis of per­
fect health, d2 is a diagnosis of a fatal disease, 
Pr(dtls) = 0.8, and Pr(d2ls) = 0.2. Now suppose we 
expand the vocabulary to include h1, . . . , hs, where the 
hi's are possible holidays that the agent will take next 
year (provided he or she is indeed healthy), and the 
agent considers each of these vacation plans equally 
likely. Then we have that Pr( h; A dtl s) = 0.1, and the 
most likely explanation of the symptom has changed 
from d 1 to d2! So just by considering possible holidays 
he might take given that he is healthy, the agent finds 
that the best explanation for his symptoms becomes a 
fatal disease. 
2. A related problem is the fact that if we have a large 
number of primitive propositions, most will probably 
be irrelevant or only marginally relevant to explaining 
a particular proposition. Yet, Pearl's definition forces 
us to consider worlds, thus forcing us to worry about 
the truth value of all propositions. This can cause 
computational problems. In addition, conciseness is a 
desirable feature in an explanation, particularly in an 
interactive system. The user usually wants to know 
only the most influential elements of the complete 
explanation, and does not want to be burdened with 
unnecessary detail. This problem is particularly se­
vere if we insist on complete explanations. However, 
Shimony's partial explanations are not necessarily as 
concise as one would hope either. It is not hard to show 
that for each evidence node X, the explanation must 
include an assignment to all the nodes in at least one 
path from X to the root, since for each relevant node, 
at least one of its parents must be relevant Moreover, 
the irrelevance condition is quite strong and only in 
limited contexts is it likely to achieve significant prun­
ing. Shimony attempts to overcome this problem by 
relaxing the irrelevance assumption to what he calls 
approximate or 8-irrelevance. While helpful in some 
domains, the extent to which it will result in concise 
explanations in general is not clear. We discuss this 
point in more detail in the full paper. 
3. The ordering on explanations used in the MAP ap­
proach is supposed to maximize the probability of 
the explanation given the explanandum. However, 
if we consider only explanations which include the 
explanandum (as all MAP explanations do), this re­
duces to maximizing the prior of the explanation. The 
ordering is then based only on the likelihood of the ex­
planation and not in any way on the degree to which the 
explanation raises the probability of the explanandum. 
4. All the MAP approaches discussed above consider es­
sentially propositional languages. Once we move to 
richer languages (like first-order, or languages that al­
low statistical information), then each world may end 
up having very low probability. Indeed, if we have a 
continuous number of worlds, each world may have 
probability 0. In this case, the definition which re­
quires explanations to be complete worlds is not even 
useful. 
Given the difficulties with complete explanations, why do 
Shimony and Henrion and Druzdzel put such restrictions 
on the allowable partial explanations? What is the prob­
lem with partial explanations? Suppose our language con­
sists of the propositions {Pl, ... , pk}. Why not just allow 
Pl as an explanation, instead of requiring something like 
Pl A ...,P2 1\ ... A -.pit? Gardenfors certainly allows such 
explanations. It is not bard to see why Pearl does not allow 
partial explanations. Notice that a partial explanation is 
really a set of worlds (or equivalently, the disjunction of the 
formulas representing the worlds). But a disjunction will 
always have higher conditional probability than any of its 
disjuncts (except in the degenerate case where all but one 
of the disjuncts has probability 0), and thus will be viewed 
as a more probable explanation than any of its disjuncts. 
It is because of this that Shimony puts restrictions on the 
allowable partial explanations as well. As we shall see, 
we can deal with this problem, at least to some extent, by 
modifying the ordering of explanations. 
4 SYNTHESIS 
As we have seen, both Gardenfors' definition and the MAP 
definition have problems. We believe that in order to deal 
with these problems, we need to deal with two relatively 
orthogonal issues: (1) we must decide what counts as an 
explanation, and (2) we must decide how to compare two 
explanations. 
4.1 WHAT COUNTS AS AN EXPLANATION? 
The MAP approach seems somewhat too restrictive in what 
counts as an explanation: An explanation must be a com­
plete description of a world (or a restricted form of partial 
explanation). Gardenfors, on the other hand, is not restric­
tive enough. He allows E A C to be an explanation of 
E, for example, and this seems to us unreasonable. In ad­
dition, he would allow a falling barometer reading to be 
an explanation for a storm, thus missing out on the causal 
structure. 
As we mentioned above, we view all explanations as causal. 
We distinguish between explaining facts and explaining be­
liefs, but in both cases we look for the same thing in an 
explanation: a causal mechanism which (possibly together 
with some facts) is responsible for the fact observed or 
the beliefs adopted. By enforcing causality, AGMwe be­
lieve that we can avoid the problems in G!rdenfors' defini­
tion, while still allowing more general explanations than the 
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MAP approach would allow. We remark that we are not the 
first to stress the role of causality in explanation. Salmon 
(I 984) discusses the issue at length, although the technical 
details of his proposal are quite different from ours. 
The literature on causality is at least as large as the literature 
on explanation; it is well beyond the scope of this paper to 
develop a new theory of causality. For the purposes of the 
rest of this paper, we work at the propositional level (since 
that is essentially what the recent approaches to causality 
do) and assume that the causal mechanism is described by 
a causal structure, which we take to be a Bayesian network 
interpreted causally. 
We believe that much of what we do is independent of the 
particular way we choose to model causality. In particular, 
we can replace the causal network by structural equations, 
as described in (Druzdzel and Simon 1993; Pearl1995). We 
have chosen to use Bayesian networks as our representation 
for causality simply to make it easier to relate our approach 
to Pearl's approach. 
In this setting, part of the agent's uncertainty concerns what 
the right causal mechanism is. For example, an agent may 
be uncertain whether smoking causes cancer or whether 
there is a gene that causes both a susceptibility to cancer 
and a susceptibility to smoking. Thus, we assume that a 
world is a pair ( w, C) consisting of a truth assignment w 
and a causal structure C. As before, an epistemic state 
K is a pair (W, Pr), where W is a set of worlds of this 
form, and Pr is a probability distribution on W. However, 
we assume that this epistemic state arises from a simpler 
description: We assume that the agent has a probability 
distribution Pr' on causal structures and has made some 
observations. Notice that a causal structure C also places 
a probability distribution Pre on worlds. We require that 
the distribution Pr be consistent with the causal mechanisms 
considered possible and the observations 0 in the following 
sense: There must be a probability distribution IY on causal 
mechanisms such that Pr(w, C) = Pr'(C) Prc(wiO): that 
is, the probability of ( w, C) is the probability of the causal 
mechanism C times the probability that C induces on w, 
given the observation. In particular, this means that if the 
agent considers only one causal mechanism possible, we 
can identify Pr with a probability on truth assignments, just 
as Pearl does. 
We assume that the explanandum E is one of the ob­
servations. This means that Pr:E has a simple form: 
Pr;;;(w,C) = Pr'(C) Prc(wiO- {E}). It is easy to see 
that this definition satisfies the postulates for contraction. 
An explanation of E in epistemic state K is a conjunction 
X = X 1 1\ X2 consisting of a partial causal mechanism 
X1 (that is, a description of a causal structure; see below) 
and an instantiation of nodes X2 that causally precede E 
in Xt such that Pr(X) < l. (Yt/e defer for now the is­
sue of whether the explanation raises the probability of the 
explanandum.) 
We are deliberately being vague about the language used to 
describe the causal mechanism, since we believe that this is 
an area for further research. For the purposes of this paper, 
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we can take Xt to be simply a description of a subgraph of 
the causal graph (intuitively, that part of the causal graph 
that is relevant to explaining E, i.e., a subset of the set of 
paths from nodes in X2 to E). 
We allow the conjunct describing the causal mechanism to 
be missing from the explanation if it is known. (In practice, 
this might mean that the system providing the explanation 
believes that the agent to whom the explanation is being pro­
vided knows the causal mechanism.) Notice that if the agent 
knows the causal mechanism, and thus considers only one 
causal mechanism possible (as is implicitly the case when a 
situation is described by a Bayesian network which is given 
a causal interpretation), then a world can be identified with 
a truth assignment. In this case (ignoring the requirement 
that all the conjuncts in a basic explanation of E must pre­
cede E causally), what Pearl called an explanation would 
be a special case of what we are calling an explanation. 
However, we allow more general explanations, in that we 
do not require an explanation to be a truth assignment. In 
this sense, our framework can be viewed as generalizing 
Pearl's and Sbimony's. 
Our definition also borrows heavily from Glirdenfors' defi­
nition. We take from him the requirement that Pr( X) < 1. 
His other requirement, that Pre(E I X )  > Pre (E), will also 
play a role in our ordering of explanations. The form of 
the explanation-a conjunction of a (partial) causal mech­
anism and an instantiations of nodes-is also taken from 
G!irdenfors.7 Since we are working with propositional 
Bayesian networks, the instantiation of nodes clearly corre­
sponds to taking the conjunction of atomic sentences in first­
order logic. Giirdenfors allows disjunctions as well (since 
he allows singular sentences, which are Boolean combina­
tions of atomic sentences). Allowing disjunctions seems to 
cause problems for us; we return to this issue in Section 4.3. 
The (partial) causal mechanism can be viewed as a gener­
alization of statistical assertions. We view the requirement 
of the causal mechanism as a key difference between our 
definition and Giirdenfors'.  For one thing, the causality 
requirement prevents E 1\ C from being an explanation of 
E, since E cannot precede E in the causal ordering. It also 
prevents a symptom from being an explanation of a disease. 
We would argue that causality is what makes most of 
Gardenfors examples involving statistics so compelling. 
For example, consider the case of Mr. Johansson. We be­
lieve that the explanation "70% of those who work with 
asbestos develop lung cancer" involves more than just the 
statistical assertion. It is accepted as an explanation because 
we implicitly accept that there is a causal structure with an 
edge from a node labeled asbestos to a node labeled lung 
cancer (with a conditional probability table saying that the 
probability of lung cancer given asbestos is 0.7). And it is 
the lack of causality that causes us (if the reader will pardon 
the pun) not to accept "70% of the time that the barometer 
reading goes down there is a storm" as an explanation of a 
storm (unless we happen to believe that barometer readings 
have a causal influence on storms). 
7 Originally, the idea carne from Hempel's work on explanation 
(Hempel and Oppenheim 1948). 
However, the situation is different if we try to explain our 
beliefs to someone else. In this case, the causal structure is 
symmetric. The fact that I believe that there is a storm does 
explain my belief that the barometer reading has gone down; 
my belief that the barometer reading has gone down is an 
explanation for my belief that there is a storm. Ultimately, 
these beliefs should be rooted in an observation (either of 
the storm or the barometer). 
We can readily convert a causal network describing a sit­
uation to a network describing an agent's beliefs. We just 
reinterpret all the nodes so that a node labeled X talks about 
the agent's belief in X ,moralize the graph and change all the 
directed edges to undirected edges. The resulting Markov 
network (Pearl 1988) captures the causal as well as proba­
bilistic dependencies between the agent's beliefs. Note that 
the resulting network is no longer asymmetric. While we 
do not view a symptom as a cause for a disease, believing 
that a patient has a certain symptom might well cause us to 
believe that he has a disease. However, an explanation for 
the agent's beliefs would then be an acyclic subnetwork of 
this network, together with some new nodes representing 
the external causes of some of the beliefs. For example, an 
external cause for the belief that the patient has symptom d 
is the observation of the symptom; an external cause for the 
belief that David has an ear infection might be receiving 
that information from a doctor. We discuss this in more 
detail in the full paper. 
4.2 ORDERING EXPLANATIONS 
As we have seen in the few examples presented so far, and 
as is indeed the case in many applications, there are typi­
cally several competing explanations. We need to be able to 
compare them and choose the best. The two proposals pre­
sented above for ordering explanations-Giirdenfors' no­
tion of explanatory power and Pearl's notion of considering 
the probability of the explanation given the explanandum­
both have their merits, but neither seems quite right to us. 
The following example might help clarify the differences 
between them. 
Example 4.1 Assume that we have a bag of 100 coins, 99 
of which are strongly biased (9:1) towards heads and one 
that is just as strongly biased towards tails. We pick a coin 
at random and toss it. The coin lands tails. 
We can nwdel this situation by using two random variables: 
C (the type of coin) with values bh and bt (biased towards 
heads and biased towards tails) and R (the result of the 
toss), with values h and t .  A priori, the probability that we 
picked a coin that is biased towards heads is very high; in 
fact P(C == bh) == 0.99. After receiving the evidence of the 
coin landing tails, we find out that P(C == bh iR=t) is close 
to 0.92-less that the prior on C = bh but still very high. 
What explanation would we accept for the fact that the coin 
landed tails? Clearly, the causal structure in this situation 
is known: there is a causal relation between C and R, with 
the obvious conditional probability table described by the 
story. Since the causal structure is known, the allowable 
explanations can be identified with C = bh and C = bt. 
What is the relative merit of these explanations? 
According to Gardenfors' definition, C = bt is a much 
better explanation than C = bh, since Pr(R = tiC = bt) is 
much greater than Pr(R = tiC = bh) , where Pr is the prior 
probability distribution, before the outcome R = t is known. 
Intuitively, C = bt has far better explanatory power because 
it accounts for the observation far better than C = bh does. 
On the other hand, the explanation seems unsatisfactory, 
since it does not take into account the low probability that 
the coin biased towards tails will be picked. 
According to Pearl's ordering, the best explanation of the 
coin landing tails is C = bh, since Pr( C = bh!R=t)  is much 
greater than Pr( C = btiR =  t).8 This explanation, although 
very likely itself, doesn't seem to relieve the "cognitive 
dissonance" between the explanandum and the rest of our 
beliefs. While it may be the correct diagnosis of the situa­
tion, it doesn't seem right to call it an explanation. The fact 
that the potential explanation is less probable a posteriori 
than a priori should at least cause some suspicion. 
Notice that by Bayes' rule, 
Pr(C = bh \R  = t) = Pr(R���: � bh) X Pr(C = bh) . 
The term Pr(���:Jbh) is what we called the explanatory 
power of C = bh with respect to R =  t. Thus, the degree 
to which C = bh is an explanation of R = t according to 
Pearl is precisely the product of EP( C = bh, R= t) and the 
prior probability of C = bh. Thus, we can see the precise 
sense in which Pearl's definition takes into account the prior 
whereas Gardenfors' does not. 
Although the two definitions disagree in this example, there 
are many situations of interest in which they agree (which is, 
perhaps, why both have seemed to be acceptable definitions 
of the notion of explanation). In particular, they agree in 
situations where the prior probability of all explanations 
is the same (or almost the same). Thus, if the user has 
no particular predisposition to accept one explanation over 
another, both approaches will view the same explanation as 
most favorable.9" 
Since we cannot always count on the prior of all explana­
tions being equal, we would like an ordering on explana­
tions that takes into account both the explanatory power 
and the prior. One obvious way of taking both into ac­
count is to multiply them, which is essentially what Pearl 
does, but multiplication loses significant information and 
sometimes gets counterintuitive results. (More examples 
of this appear below.) A straightforward alternative is to 
associate with each explanation X of E the pair of numbers 
(EP(X, E) , Pr:E(X)) :  the explanatory power of X with 
8Note that, according to Pearl's definition, C = bh would not 
be an explanation of R = t. The two possible explanations would 
be C =  bh i\ R == t  and C = bt l\  R = t. What we are analyzing here 
is the ordering produced by Pearl's definition of better explanation 
on the notion of explanation defined according to our approach. 
9Here we are also implicitly assuming that there is a prior 
agreement on what counts as an explanation. As we have ob­
served, the two approaches differ in this respect too. 
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respect to E and the prior of X. We can then place a partial 
order t E on explanations of E by taking X 1 t E X 2 iff 
EP(X1 , E) � EP(X2, E) and Pr:E(XJ ) � Pr:E(X2) ·  
Notice that with thi s  ordering, the two explanations in the 
coin example, C = bh and C = bt, are incomparable. This 
forces the user to decide whether the explanatory power or 
the prior is the more significant feature here. In a case like 
this, such a wide divergence between the explanatory power 
and the prior of two explanations might signal a problem 
with the causal model. Perhaps the agent's prior on C = bh 
vs. C = bt is incorrect in this case. 
Although the ordering is partial in general, it can be viewed 
as a natural generalization of Pearl's ordering. Suppose the 
causal mechanism is known, as is implicitly assumed by 
Pearl. If we allow explanations that are complete descrip­
tions of worlds, then all complete descriptions that include 
E have exactly the same explanatory power: 1 /  Pr:E(E).  
Thus, our ordering would order them by their prior, just as 
Pearl's and Shimony's does. 
Our ordering also avoids the problem in Gardenfors' or­
dering that adding irrelevant conjuncts results in an equally 
preferred explanation. For example, if X is an explanation 
of E then X 1\ Y (for all Y conditionally independent of 
E given the epistemic state) would be considered a worse 
explanation than X in our ordering since their explanatory 
powers are the same and X 's prior is higher. 
If we add a conjunct that is not completely irrelevant, then 
our approach forces the agent to decide between more spe­
cific explanations that have higher explanatory power, and 
less specific explanations, that have a higher prior. For 
example, suppose we want to understand why a somewhat 
sheltered part of the lawn is wet. One possible explanation 
is that it rained last night, but rain does not always cause 
that part of the lawn to get wet. A better explanation might 
be that it was raining and very windy. The combination of 
rain and wind has better explanatory power than rain alone, 
but a lower prior. According to our ordering, this makes 
the two explanations incomparable. This does not seem 
so unreasonable in this case. We would expect a useful 
explanatory system to point out both possible explanations, 
and let the user decide if the gain from the extra explanatory 
power of wind is sufficiently high to merit the lower prior. 
Note that if we multiply the explanatory power of the ex­
planation by its prior, we will always prefer the expla­
nation "rain". To see this, note that for any explanation 
X, the product of the explanatory power and the prior is 
Pr:E (X JE) .  Since clearly Pr:E(XJE) � Pr:E(X A YIE),  
the simpler explanation i s  preferred. This is a case where 
multiplication causes a loss of useful information. 
4.3 DEALING WlTH DISJUNCTIONS 
As we have defined it, an explanation is a conjunction of 
a partial causal mechanism together with an instantiation 
of nodes. We have not allowed disjunctions. Disallow­
ing disjunctions of causal mechanisms seems reasonable. 
It is consistent with the intuition that "you have cancer 
either because you smoke or because you have a genetic 
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predisposition to cancer" is viewed as a disjunction of two 
explanations, not one explanation which has the form of a 
disjunction. We suspect that it is for similar reasons that 
Gardenfors disallowed the disjunction of statistical asser­
tions in his definition. 
On the swface, it may seem less reasonable to disallow 
the disjunction of instantiations of nodes. Certainly it is 
straightforward to modify our definition so as to allow them, 
and doing so would be more in keeping with Glirdenfors' 
allowing singular sentences. However, notice that allowing 
the disjunction of instantiations bas the effect of allowing 
disjunctions of causal mechanisms. 
Consider a case in which we ask for an explanation of huge 
forest fires recently occurring in California. One possible 
explanation is that the fire prevention caused the brush to 
overgrow, another that the tourists often leave campfires 
unattended. Both these explanations are very plausible (and 
so is their conjunction). Suppose the agent considers only 
one causal network possible, and it contains both of these 
mechanisms. Thus, by allowing the explanation "either 
some tourists left their campfire unattended or the brush 
was overgrown", we are effectively allowing a disjunction 
of causal mechanisms. This example suggests that we may 
want to make a distinction between what appear to be two 
different causal mechanisms co-existing within the same 
causal structure (perhaps using the techniques discussed by 
Druzdzel and Simon (1993)). This is an area for future 
research. 
On the other hand, there are cases where allowing disjunc­
tions seems useful. For example, consider a situation in 
which we have four coins, Ct , C2, C3 , and C4 , where Ct 
and c2 . are biased towards heads and c3 and c4 are bi­
ased toward tails. We pick one coin at random and toss 
it three times. The coin lands heads every time. The ob­
vious explanation for this fact is that we picked one of 
the coins biased towards heads, that is, either cl or c2 . 
And, indeed, our ordering would prefer the explanation 
X1 =det ( C = CJ ) v ( C = C2) to either of the explanations 
C = C1 or C = C2, assuming that both C1 and C2 had the 
same bias. 
By way of contrast, the explanation X2 =dcf (C = Ct ) V 
( C = C2 ) v ( C = C3 ) does not seem at all reasonable 
although, according to our ordering, it is incomparable to 
XJ . While XI has higher explanatory power, x2 has a 
higher prior. While most people would clearly reject X2 , 
it would be useful to have to have some automatic way of 
rejecting it.10 
This example suggests that rather than allowing disjunc­
tions, a better strategy might be to add an additional variable 
representing the type of the coin (with possible values bh 
and bt, as before). However, we have as yet no principled 
10orhis is another case where multiplying the components gives a 
misleading answer: Xz has a higher product than X1 . In general, 
if we compare the explanation X to a disjunctive explanation 
X V Y by multiplying the explanatory power times the prior, then 
we will always prefer X V  Y to X ,  for the same reasons as given 
earlier for preferring X to X 1\ Y. 
way for deciding when to add such variables. 
Shimony's work can be viewed as an attempt to provide 
principles as to when to consider disjunctive explanations. 
The partial explanations of (Shimony 1 991) are sets of 
worlds where the truth values of some primitive propo­
sitions are fixed, while the rest can be arbitrary. The sets of 
partial explanations of (Shimony 1993) correspond to more 
general sets of worlds, but there are still significant restric­
tions. For example, the disjunctive explanation must corre­
spond to a node already in the network and the probability 
of the explanandum must be the same for every disjunct in 
the disjunctive explanation. The latter restriction is quite 
severe. In our coin example, if the coins biased towards 
heads have different biases, Shimony's approach would not 
allow us to consider the explanation xl ' "we picked a coin 
biased towards heads". Of course, we can easily loosen 
this restriction to allow disjunctions where the conditional 
probabilities are almost the same. However, it seems to us 
that we want more than just similar conditional probabili­
ties here. We only want to allow disjunctions if the causal 
mechanism for each disjunct is the same. 
To be fair, Shimony uses his restrictions to allow him to find 
good explanations algorithmically. It is not clear whether 
there are also philosophical reasons to restrict them in this 
way. We hope to explore both the algorithmic and founda­
tional issues in future work. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
We feel that the contribution of this paper is twofold: First, 
we present a critique of two important approaches to ex­
planation; second, we outline a sketch of a novel approach 
that tries to take into account the best features of both, and 
combine them with a notion of causality. 
Our approach clearly needs to be fieshed out. Some areas 
for future research include: 
• Obviously, much of the effort will involve research in 
causality. Most of the work in causality has allowed 
only what amounts to propositional reasoning. (The 
nodes represent random variables that take on a small 
finite number of values.) Can we extend it to allow 
causal explanations that involve first-order constructs 
and temporal constructs? There has been some work 
on adding these constructs to Bayesian networks (see, 
for example, (Dean and Kanazawa 1989; Glesner and 
Koller 1995; Haddawy 1994)). but no work focusing 
on their application to causal reasoning. Along simi­
lar lines, it would be useful to have a good language 
for reasoning about causality, that allowed first-order 
reasoning and temporal constructs. 
• As we have observed, our approach, which provides 
only a partial ordering on explanations, seems too 
weak. While it is not clear that we want to have a 
total order, it does seem that we want to allow more 
explanations to be comparable than is the case accord­
ing to our ordering. This is particularly the case if we 
allow disjunctive explanations. 
• A natural extension would be to apply our definition 
to countetfactuals. 
After all, humans seem to have no problem with ex­
plaining hypothetical facts. We believe that our basic 
framework should be able to handle this, although per­
haps we may need to use structural equations and the 
interpretation of countetfactuals given by Balke and 
Pearl ( 1994). 
• As we said earlier, given that our goal is to have the 
system provide an explanation that is useful to a user, 
it would be important to model the user's knowledge 
state and adjust explanations accordingly. The work of 
Suermondt (1 992) is relevant in this regard. He also 
puts the emphasis on explaining beliefs (or, specifi­
cally, probability distribution over the node of inter­
est) adopted by the system as a result of receiving some 
observation. His goal is to find a small subset of ev­
idence responsible for this change and the links most 
influential in transmitting it. In our context, we can 
understand Suermondt as considering a system which 
has full knowledge of the domain (characterized by a 
Bayes Net together with all the conditional probability 
tables) and knows the values of some variables, trying 
to explain its beliefs to a user with no (or minimal) 
knowledge. Thus, for him, an explanation amounts to 
finding a "small" set of instantiations of variables (i.e., 
a partial truth assignment) and a ' small" partial causal 
mechanism that will raise the posterior probability of 
the observations. 
Given the importance of explanation, we believe that these 
questions represent fruitful lines for further research. 
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